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The Story as a Social Environment: Children's Comprehension
and Evaluation of Intentions and Consequences
In her review of the research concerning the development of social
cognition, Shantz (1975) discusses how children come to understand the
thoughts, emotions, intentions,and viewpoints of other people. This
understanding is inferential in nature since much of the content cannot
be directly observed and a child must "go beyond the information given"
(Bartlett, 1932). Although several studies involve perceptual processing
such as in investigations of role-taking (Flavell, 1968) or film under-
standing (Flapan, 1968), the vast majority of studies in developmental
social cognition are primarily verbal and rely extensively on the use
of stories as their main source of information about social inferences.
Stories serve many functions in communication. They summarize
events concerning happenings to people. They tell us about the goals,
plans, and behavior of others. They involve conflict and conflict
resolution. They attempt to socialize children by providing examples
of desirable behavior which is rewarded and undesirable behavior which
is punished. They often are succinct summaries of social events gener-
ated by a naive theory of psychology (Heider, 1958), especially of
human intentionality.
In this chapter, we shall consider the story as a representation
designed for children of the personal-social world. An analysis of
children's ability to comprehend the structure and content of stories
should tell us much about what they know about this world.
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Our focus will be on what has been called "moral judgment" research,
in which children are asked to make evaluative inferences about a story,
protagonist's intentions, and/or the consequences of his actions. A sub-
stantial amount of this research was initially stimulated by Piaget (1932).
According to Piaget, children exhibit two types of moral thought: objective
and subjective responsibility. In objective responsibility, which is the
less developmentally advanced type of thought, an actor is evaluated
solely or primarily on the basis of the consequences of his behavior
rather than on the intentions behind his performing the behavior. By con-
trast, for subjective responsibility judgments, which represent the more
developmentally advanced thought, the actor is evaluated solely or pri-
marily on the basis of his intentions, rather than on the consequences of
his behavior. Having observed that the same child would often make ob-
jective responsibility judgments at one time but subjective judgments at
another, Piaget did not believe that objective and subjective responsibility
represented different stages of development, but he nevertheless did claim
that these two types of moral thought followed a developmental trend, with
objective responsibility judgments decreasing and subjective responsibility
judgments increasing with age.
In his classical paradigm for assessing these two types of judgments,
Piaget presented a pair of stories to each child. One of the stories in
the pair depicted a protagonist who acted from "good" intentions but
accidentally produced a large amount of damage, while the other story
portrayed a protagonist who acted with "bad" intentions but produced only
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a small amount of damage. After listening to both stories, the child was
asked to indicate which of the two protagonists he thought was naughtier.
If he judged the protagonist who produced the greater damage as naughtier
despite his "good" intentions, the child was classified as giving an ob-
jective responsibility response. However, if he evaluated the character
who produced less damage but acted from bad intentions as naughtier, he
was scored as giving a subjective responsibility response.
Piaget's seminal work stimulated activity on two questions, one
having to do with children's comprehension of motives and intentions, and
the other with how information about motives and intentions influences
children's moral judgments (Keasey, 1978). The two questions are related
in that children obviously must have at least some awareness and under-
standing of intentions before they can make moral judgments that are
based on them. However, they are independent in that children may know
about intentions but not consider them when making moral judgments. As
Keasey has also pointed out, Piaget meant objective and subjective res-
ponsibility to pertain to whether a child used intention information to
make moral judgments, not to whether he was aware of intentions. Piaget,
in fact, even reported that children who made objective responsibility
judgments often were aware of the actor's intentions. Piaget's original
claims notwithstanding, the subsequent literature has pursued both
questions, even though the distinction between them has not always been
recognized or dealt with appropriately.
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Analysis of Motive and Intention Information
Despite the substantial amount of effort that has been devoted to
investigating children's comprehension of motives and intentions, very
little consideration has been given to how information about motives and
intentions is portrayed for children. This is unfortunate because even
a cursory examination of the literature will indicate that investigators
have depicted motives and intentions in a great variety of ways. Although
it has frequently been recognized that the type of information presented
to a child is likely to have an important effect on his understanding
of a character's motives and intentions, there has been little direct
analysis and systematic investigation of this problem. This section of
the paper attempts to fill in part of this lacuna, with the following
discussion being motivated by the fact that children's understanding of
motives and intentions has usually been assessed in terms of their
responses to stories or story-like materials (Shantz, 1975). Accordingly,
the focus here will be on how motive and intention information is conveyed
in stories or story-like materials and on the effects that this might
have upon the child's comprehension. We will consider how motives and
intentions are depicted in filmed or video-taped episodes as well as in
verbal stories, since the former also have a story-like character, in that
the sequence of events portrayed in this format usually parallels that of
stories. It may be that there are intrinsic differences between the two
media which dramatically affect the comprehension of motives and intentions,
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but we ignore this possibility here and instead concentrate on their
similarity in event structure.
Story Grammar Analysis
Recently, several investigators (e.g., Mandler & Johnson, 1977;
Rumelhart, 1976; Stein & Glenn, 1979; Thorndyke, 1977; Warren, Nicholas,
& Trabasso, 1979) have developed story grammars and inference taxonomies
to analyze the structure of simple stories. Since the story grammar
proposed by Stein and Glenn (1979) seems to be well suited for dealing
with the type of goal-motivated activity that is commonly depicted in moral
judgment research, our focus will be on this grammar and most particularly
on those of its aspects that are relevant to analyzing motive and in-
tention information.
Stein & Glenn's grammar, like the other story grammars, has two major
components: categories of information, which specify ,the different types
of information contained in the story, and logical relations, which specify
how the categories are connected or related to each other. The key struc-
ture in the grammar is the episode, or behavioral sequence, which consists
of six main categories plus the relations that connect them. The first
category is the setting which introduces characters, provides background
information, sets the locale and time, and describes personal traits and
dispositions. This is followed by the initiating event, which is some event
or happening that begins a character's behavior sequence. The initiating
event can be an event external to the protagonist, such as the action of
another person (e.g., getting punched by someone), or it can be an action
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or internal event originating in the actor (such as the experiencing of
pain or hunger). The initiating event evokes some type of internal response
in the protagonist, which is the third major category in the episode.
Internal responses include affective or emotional responses, goals or de-
sires, and thoughts or cognitions. The internal responses then motivate
him to make some sort of attempt to satisfy his goals and desires. The
attempt category represents the overt actions which the protagonist per-
forms in order to satisfy his goals. The protagonist's attempt, in turn,
results in some kind of direct consequence. The direct consequence category
indicates whether or not the protagonist attained his goals and suggests
other changes in the event sequence that result from the attempt. The
direct consequence also initiates or causes a reaction on the part of
either the protagonist or some other character. Reactions most commonly
indicate how the protagonist feels, thinks, or behaves in response to
direct consequences, but they may also specify how other characters are
affected by direct consequences.
The complete grammar of Stein and Glenn (1979) actually contains a great
deal beyond what is presented here. However, most of that is not critical
to this discussion, as nearly all of the stories used in the moral judgment
literature can be analyzed in terms of the single episode structure
described above. For a simple example of how this episode structure can
be used to analyze these stories, consider the following story used by
Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, and Farnill (1973):
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Michael was playing in the toy room. He noticed that the
toys were in a big mess and decided to straighten them up.
He emptied the toy box onto the floor in order to sort and
arrange the toys properly. Just then Mrs. Green came into
the room and said, "Oh, Michael. We're going to have company
in a few minutes and now you've messed the room all up."
In this story, the setting presents Michael at play in the toy room, and
the initiating event is his observation that the toys are in a mess.
This event leads to Michael's decision to straighten up the toys, which
is an internal response. This, in turn, motivates him to empty the toys
on the floor, which is an attempt. The direct consequence resulting
from Michael's attempt is not explicitly stated in the story, but it is
most likely that the toys are lying in some sort of haphazard arrangement
on the floor. Whatever its exact nature, the direct consequence initiates
the reaction of displeasure by Mrs. Green when she walks in the room and
sees the toys scattered on the floor.
Although a "well-formed" or "ideal" story will contain all six of
the categories in an episode, in reality, stories often do not explicitly
express all of the categories. For example, Stein and Glenn (1979) note
that folktales often omit the internal response and reaction categories,
probably because these categories are strongly implied by the information
specified in the other categories. The stories used in moral judgment
research also typically omit one or more of the categories, the reaction
category probably being the one most often omitted, with initiating events
also omitted quite frequently. However, even when a category is not
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explicitly expressed in a story, the grammar implicitly represents it and
thus calls attention to its existence.
Two different claims can be made about a grammar. One is that the
categories and relations in the grammar represent the internal structures
or cognitive schematawhich the subject uses to encode and organize infor-
mation during story comprehension (Stein, 1979). The other, more modest
claim is that the grammar is a useful tool for analyzing the information
that is contained both explicitly and implicitly in a story and, therefore,
for constructing and analyzing stimulus materials.
Extension of Grammar to Account for Motives and Intentions
By itself, Stein and Glenn's (1979) story grammar does not adequately
account for many of the ways in which motive and intention information are
conveyed in stories. Consequently, we need to supplement their grammar
with a more extensive analysis of the problem. In doing so, we borrow from
three main sources. One involves spelling out in greater detail some of
the implications of the grammar itself. Another comes from some of the
ideas of social psychologists who have contributed to the development of
attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1972;
Kruglanski, 1975). And the third comes from an examination of some of the
various stimulus materials that have been used in the literature.
Before proceeding, it is important that we give some attention to
the distinction between the concepts of motive and intentionality (Berndt &
Berndt, 1975; Heider, 1958; Keasey, 1978; Shantz, 1975). Briefly, the
concept of motive refers to the goal of an actor's behavior or to the
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particular reason he has for performing an action, whereas the concept
of intentionality refers to whether an action and/or its consequences
were intentionally or accidentally produced by the actor. These two con-
cepts are partially interdependent, since the attribution of a motive to
an action implies, of course, that the act was intended, and the attri-
bution that an action or behavior was accidentally performed implies that
it cannot be accounted for in terms of a motive (i.e., one does not
attribute a motive to an actor for accidentally losing his balance and
falling down). Nevertheless, the two are not identical. An act may be
accounted for by a particular motive, and thus be intended, but its
consequences may not have been intended. Thus, the attribution of a
motive to an act does not necessarily imply that all or indeed any of the
actual consequences of the act were intended. Since there seem to be good
conceptual and empirical reasons for distinguishing between motives and
intentions (see especially Keasey, 1978), we will attempt to maintain this
distinction wherever it is relevant.
Story information about a character's motives and intentions can
come from six main sources, which very closely parallel the categories
of the Stein and Glenn (1979) grammar. One source is information about
the internal states of the character, which corresponds with the internal
response category of the Stein and Glenn grammar. According to the grammar,
this information can relate to the character's goals or desires (e.g.,
"Mary wanted to hit John"), her feelings or affective responses (e.g.,
"Mary was very angry"), or to her thoughts or cognitions (e.g., "Mary
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thought John was obnoxious"). A second source of information, corresponding
to the attempt category in the grammar, concerns the actor's behavior (e.g.,
"Mary hit John"). A third source, corresponding to Stein and Glenn's direct
consequence category, is about the immediate consequences or results of
the act (e.g., "John got a black eye from Mary"). Although actions and
consequences are viewed as separate sources of information here, it should
be noted that in the natural language description of event sequences, infor-
mation about actions and consequences is very often conveyed simultaneously
rather than separately. For example, the statement, "Frank killed a rat,"
indicates both that Frank acted in some violent way against the rat and
that the consequence of his action was the death of the rat. In this
kind of case, it is difficult to make a clean distinction as to whether
actions or consequences are being described. The story example from
Costanzo et al. (1973), presented above, is another example of this. A
fourth source of information, which parallels the reaction category in the
grammar, is how the actor reacts or responds to the consequences which her
actions produce; i.e., whether she feels surprised, happy, upset, or guilty
(e.g., "Mary felt glad when she hit John"). A fifth source of information
concerns what kinds of situational or external forces are operating upon
the actor and how these influence her (e.g., "Mary's mother told her to
hit John"). A final source is the setting itself, in which the character's
habitual actions or states supply motives for subsequent actions. For
example, "Mary and John were enemies" allows one to infer a reason for
why Mary later hits John, namely, Mary disliked John and wanted to harm him.
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Each of these sources of information may by itself or through explicit
or implicit relationships with other sources allow one to infer what are a
character's motives and intentions. Consider information about the char-
acter's internal states, which is obviously important for identifying a
character's motives and intentions. Internal state information can be
provided in various ways in a story or video episode. For example, it may
be explicitly given, as when a story contains a statement such as "Bill
wanted to help his friend," or when a character verbally expresses his
desires or feelings (e.g., "Bill said, 'I want to help Mother'"). This
latter technique seems to be a common way of depicting motives and in-
tentions for audio visual stimuli. Internal states are also often
conveyed in the video format through facial expressions, tone of voice,
body position and movement, etc., with the explicitness of these cues
varying from being very clear (e.g., making an emphatic expression of
fear and horror) to being very subtle (e.g., showing slight signs of
uneasiness). Subtle and inexplicit cues about internal states obviously
should be less likely to be detected or used to infer intentions and
motives than should clear and explicit information.
Motives and intentions are also specified by the relationships between
internal state information and other sources of information. One of the
most important of these relationships is that between internal states and
actions. Information about internal states and actions is often redundant,
so that information about one may imply or suggest information about the
other. Thus, knowing that an actor desires to harm another person, we
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expect such actions as hitting, pushing, punching, etc. Similarly, knowing
that an actor is angry, we are not surprised when he hits someone. Conversely,
if an actor hits someone, we readily infer that he wanted to hurt that person,
was angry at him, etc. This predictability between interanl states and
actions is, of course, not perfect. Several actions may be consistent with
a particular internal state, and vice versa. The goal of helping someone,
for example, can be expressed through a diversity of behaviors, including
such things as giving money, performing services, giving advice, etc.
Further, internal states and actions may often be related in unusual ways.
For example, a mother's desire to help her child might lead to her hitting
the child. Her behavior would then seem inconsistent with her goal until
it were realized that she acted to prevent him from running into the street
and getting struck by traffic.
Since the concept of motive refers to the goal of a particular be-
havior, the tendency towards having predictable or natural associations
between internal states and actions leads to the formulation of a very
simple rule for determining an actor's motive: when information about
internal states and actions is consistent (i.e., the character's goals,
feelings, and thoughts are consistent with his subsequent actions), then
the goal which is stated in or implied by the internal state information
is perceived as accounting for the actor's motive for his behavior. An
example from one of the film episodes used by Hewitt (1974) should illus-
trate this rule. In this episode, one boy says to another, "I'm going to
get you for calling me that," and then lets a table fall on the other's
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leg. In this case the actor's behavior should be attributed to a motive
of revenge, since this is the goal which he expresses verbally and since
his action of letting a table fall on the other boy is consistent with
that goal.
When internal state information is concerned not with the character's
goals but with his feelings and cognitions, the attribution of a motive
often can still be made by inferring a goal that is consistent with both
the actor's cognitions or feelings and his action. For example, consider
the following statements:
Karen was angry. She hit Judy.
In this instance it will readily be inferred that the motive for Karen's
behavior was to hurt Judy, since anger is very consistent with the desire
to hurt, as is the behavior of hitting.
When inferences are being made about intentionality, as opposed to
motivation, the relationship between internal states and consequences is
extremely important because part of the definition of intentionality is
that the outcome or the consequences of an actor's behavior be those which
he wanted or desired to produce. This suggests that an important rule
for inferring whether the consequences of a character's actions were
intentionally or accidentally produced is the extent to which those
consequences are consistent with the character's goals as stated or im-
plied by the available internal state information. If the consequences
are consistent with the stated or implied goals of the actor, an inference
that the consequences were intended is likely. If, on the other hand,
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this information is inconsistent, an inference that the consequences were
accidentally produced would become more likely. An example of this can
be seen from one of Piaget's (1932) stories:
A little boy who was called Augustus once noticed that his
father's ink-pot was empty. One day that his father was
away he thought of filling the ink-pot so as to help his father,
and so that he should find it full when he came home. But
while he was opening the ink-bottle he made a big blot on the
table cloth. (p. 118)
Since Augustus' goal of helping his father is not consistent with getting
a big blot of ink on the table cloth, he probably did not intend this to
happen.
Another internal state-consequence relationship of particular rele-
vance to the making of inferences about intentionality is that between the
knowledge which the actor has about the possible consequences of his action
and the actual consequences produced by his behavior. Heider (1958) and
Jones and Davis (1965) have noted that consequences which an actor could
not have foreseen cannot have been intended by him. Accordingly, one
rule governing the attribution of intentionality is that when the conse-
quences of an actor's behavior are those which he expected or knew could
occur, he probably intended those consequences; if he was not expecting
the consequences, he produced them accidentally. Again, one of Piaget's
stories illustrates the application of this rule:
A little boy who is called John is in his room. He is
called to dinner. He goes into the dining room. But
behind the door was a chair, and on the chair there was
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a tray with fifteen cups on it. John couldn't have known
there was all this behind the door. He goes in, the door
knocks against the tray, bang go the fifteen cups and they
all get broken! (p. 118)
Since John had no knowledge that his opening of the door would break the
cups, he had to have broken the cups accidentally. Information concerning
an actor's knowledge about the consequences which his actions will produce
may be explicitly stated or only implied in a story. Piaget's story, for
example, explicitly states that John did notknow that the tray of cups was
behind the door. However, even if the statement about John's lack of
knowledge was deleted from the story, we would still probably infer that
he accidentally broke the cups, because a door usually does not have cups
behind it,and no indication is given that John is aware of this unusual
situation.
Another relationship which may specify intentionality is that between
actions and consequences. For a particular action, some consequences are
more likely to result than others. For example, some plausible consequences
of hitting a person are that he will get a black eye, a bloody nose, a
bruise, etc. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the hitting will
improve the victim's physical condition or make him feel good. Although
this association between actions and their likely consequences is not
perfect and is stronger for some action-consequence links than others,
it is still often strong enough to provide information about whether an
actor intended the consequences which his behavior produced. Therefore,
the greater the extent to which an action produces consequences not
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usually associated with it, the more likely it is that those consequences
were unintended, provided of course there is not information that the
actor was expecting the unusual consequences to occur. One of Elkind and
Dabek's (1977) stories demonstrates this rule:
Larry is playing with a ball in the park. He throws the ball
and when it comes down it hits and breaks his friend's glasses
that are on the bench.
Since throwing a ball and letting it land does not ordinarily result in
glasses being broken, Larry probably did not intend to break the glasses.
In some cases, information about actions alone may specify intention-
ality. This is because certain characteristics of an action, such as its
form, persistence, or intensity, often provide cues as to whether it is
being intentionally or accidentally performed. With respect to its form,
actions are sometimes described in a story or depicted in a film sequence
in such a way that unintentional activity is indicated. For instance,
involuntary actions such as "tripped," "slipped," "fell," and "bumped,"
indicate that unintentional activity is involved. In video presentations,
the manner in which an actor performs a behavior may convey information
about whether his activity is intentional or accidental. For instance,
an actor in a video episode constructed by Farnill (1974) showed fumbling
and shaking motions as he dropped a flowerpot, indicating that this
action was unintended.
Another informative set of cues about the intentionality of a behavior
concerns its persistence and intensity. Since intention implies effort
(Heider, 1958), the greater the persistence and the intensity of a behavior,
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the more likely it is that the behavior is intended. If a child were to
break one dish, we could believe this to be accidental; but if he were
to break five dishes, one after the other, we would readily infer that
his breaking of the dishes was intentional. Finally, it is important to
note that when an action is judged to have been accidentally performed,
this means that the consequences of that action could not have been in-
tended by the actor.
How the actor reacts to the consequences of his behavior may also
help to specify his motives and intentions. People generally react
positively when the consequences of their behavior are consistent with
their goals and negatively when they are not. Thus, if a character
expresses dissatisfaction with the consequences of his behavior, it is
not likely that he performed the behavior in order to produce those
consequences. If, in contrast, he expresses satisfaction, it is more
likely that he intended the consequences. Further, certain reactions
are especially informative about the actor's intentions. For example,
a reaction of surprise strongly suggests that a consequence, or at least
the magnitude of it, was not expected. This relationship between conse-
quences and reactions is obviously not a perfect index of motives and
intentions, since an actor may be pleased when his actions fortuitously
result in good outcomes or be dissatisfied when his behavior produces
consequences which he had known might occur but hoped would not.
Nonetheless, an actor's reactions to the consequences of his actions
often serve as good indices of the intentions underlying his behavior.
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The following description of a film segment used by Flapan (1968) demon-
strates how reactions to consequences can give cues about a character's
motives and intentions:
She tries to "show him" how she will shoot by throwing a
rock at the squirrel. The rock kills the squirrel, which
surprises and grieves the girl. Crying, she says she didn't
mean it. (p. 14)
In this sequence,several of the girl's reactions indicate that she had not
intended to kill the squirrel; e.g., her expression of grief and surprise,
crying, and saying that she hadn't meant to do it.
Still another way of specifying motives and intentions is by providing
information about the external forces operating upon the actor and the
effect that these forces have upon his behavior. Kelley's (1972) dis-
counting principle expresses one important rule for using this type of
information to infer a character's motives. The discounting principle
states that a given cause is less likely to be inferred as producing an
effect if it is known that there are also other causes that may have
produced the effect. From the discounting principle, we can derive the
rule that when a behavior is preceded by an external initiating event,
an explanation of the behavior in terms of an alternative internal cause
should become less likely. For instance,we are less likely to infer that
a child's motive for washing dishes is to help his mother when we know
that his mother has ordered him to do the dishes.
An actor's motives will also be reflected in the way that he responds
to external forces. Kruglanski's (1975) analysis suggests another rule
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for connecting an actor's responses to external forces with his motives:
when an actor is motivated by a particular goal, his attempts to satisfy
that goal will not be influenced by situational factors which neither
change his goal nor affect the possibility of achieving it. That is, an
actor's behavior will be affected only by situational forces that are
pertinent to the goals which that behavior expresses. Thus, by seeing
how an actor's behavior co-varies with different situations, we can obtain
important information about the motives behind it. For instance, one way
of determining the reason a woman is marrying a wealthy man (whether it
is because she loves him or because she is interested in his money) is to
observe how she responds when her suitor suddenly loses his wealth. If
her real motive is love, then she will still marry him because the loss
of his wealth will not affect her motive. On the other hand, if her motive
is monetary, she will call off the marriage because her desire will then
have no chance of being satisfied. A corollary of the above rule is
that when an actor's attempt to satisfy a goal is blocked by the situation,
he will tend to continue making other attempts to satisfy that goal.
Continuing the previous scenario, if the woman's real motive for marriage
is monetary, she can be expected to look for another wealthy suitor if
her current one loses his wealth. Another source of inferring intentionality
is in setting information where a character's habitual actions or states imply
salient, long-term goals. For example, if a story depicts a character who
intensely dislikes school and, if the story states that he is not in school
one day, the inference will be made that he was not because he did not want
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to be, and not because he was ill. The rule here is that habitual actions
or states imply goals which account for the specific actions and outcomes
depicted in a story unless other information indicates otherwise.
Applications of the Motive and Intention Analysis
One of the advantages of the above analysis is that it focuses the
researcher's attention on the character of the information contained in
the stimulus materials. Doing an explicit analysis of stimulus materials
is important, because it is common to find in the moral judgment literature
stories and film episodes which are poorly constructed. In addition,
characters' motives and intentions are often ambiguously portrayed. The
following story, employed by Piaget (1932), illustrates these problems:
There was a little boy called Julian. His father had gone
out and Julian thought it would be fun to play with his
father's ink-pot. First he played with the pen, and then
he made a little blot on the table cloth. (p. 118)
In this story, it is, first of all, unclear whether Julian's motive for
playing with his father's pen and ink-pot was bad or merely neutral.
Since Julian was playing with the writing instruments when his father
was gone, this suggests that he may have been doing something he was
not supposed to do. However, the story fails to make a clear connec-
tion between Julian's playing and his father's absence, so it is also
reasonable to infer that Julian was not engaging in any forbidden
activity. Second, the story provides virtually no relevant informa-
tion for determining whether Julian intentionally or accidentally made
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the ink blot. For this sort of story, where information about consequences
is clearer and more salient than that about motives and intentions, it is
not hard to see why a young child might emphasize the former more than
the latter in making moral judgments.
The extended story grammar analysis is also useful for investigating
the effects that variation of stimulus information has upon children's
understanding and motives and intentions. For this kind of research,
several degrees of difficulty with respect to inferring motives and
intentions from story information can be identified at a gross level.
The easiest case should be when the actor's motives and intentions are
explicitly stated. The following story,employed by Leon (1979), provides
such an example:
John was very mad at one of his friends. He saw his friend
coming. He picked up a rock and threw it at his friend.
The rock hit John's friend on the leg and made a bruise.
It is quite clear that John's motive for throwing the rock is to hurt his
friend and that the damage to his friend is intentional. This is because
the internal state, action, and consequence information in this story are
strongly and consistently related. Throwing a rock implies the desire
to harm, and this is, in turn, consistent with the internal state of being
mad and with the consequence of bruising his friend's leg.
As information about motives and intentions is made less explicit
and relationships between categories of information weaken, making
inferences about motives and intentions become more difficult. Compare,
for example, the following story also used by Leon (1979):
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Mike and a friend were throwing rocks against a wall. Mike
threw a rock against the wall. The rock bounced back toward
Mike's friend. The rock hit Mike's friend on the leg and
made a bruise.
In this story, there is little explicit information about motives
and intentions. For example, there is no information about Mike's
internal states; i.e., whether he is angry at his friend, wants to hurt
him, or has any expectations about what will happen when he throws the
rock against the wall. The description of the action suggests that the
consequences were probably unintended: when a thrown object is deflected
and then hits someone, it is likely that this happened accidentally.
Still, it is possible that Mike was throwing rocks against the wall in
the hope that one would bounce back and hit his friend. Consequently,
these inferences appear to be harder to make than those for the first of
Leon's stories above.
The most difficult situation for making inferences may be when
different categories of information are inconsistent or in conflict with
each other. Warren, Nicholas, and Trabasso (1979) provide an example
of this:
Chris wanted to help his mom. Chris broke all the eggs
in the refrigerator. Chris finished in time for supper.
In this sequence, there is an inconsistency between Chris' motive to help
his mother and his breaking of the eggs. Warren et al. suggest that one
way the comprehender might try to resolve this inconsistency is to infer
a plausible rationale for relating Chris' goal and his behavior plus its
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consequences; for example, that as he went to the refrigerator to take
out the milk, he accidentally knocked over a carton of eggs. Attributions
of motives and intentions may be especially difficult when there are
contradictions between categories of information, because the contradic-
tions not only must be detected but must also be resolved in some way,
which requires a search for plausible means of resolution.
The above discussion implies a program of research which tests the
validity of the rules as well as developmental differences in rule
knowledge and usage. Studies by Harris (1977) and Sedlak (1979) are sug-
gestive since they assessed children's understanding of Heider's (1958)
levels of responsibility attribution. Since their stories represent
multidimensional combinations of several factors such as causal relations,
goals, foreseeability, and expense constraints, interpretations of their
findings are not simple. Both studies found, however, that older chil-
dren and adults were more sensitive to the factors subsumed under Heider's
levels than were the younger children who either did not differentiate
causal attributions across levels (Harris) or were more affected by
outcomes (Sedlak).
Review of the Standard or Traditional Moral Judgment Literature
The discussion to this point has emphasized that children's under-
standing of motives and intentions is likely to depend heavily upon the
nature of the stimulus materials used to assess this comprehension.
Another hypothesis which is suggested by our analysis is that younger
children's comprehension should be influenced more than older children's
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by variation in stimulus content. These developmental differences in
comprehension should be a function of the salience and explicitness of
motive and intention information. Although these issues and hypotheses
have frequently been discussed in the literature (e.g., Chandler,
Greenspan, & Barenboim, 1973; Leon, 1979), they have rarely been dealt
with in an explicit manner. Consequently, any review of research
which provides data relevant to these issues must be limited. Nevertheless,
some studies provide informative or suggestive data. A brief and selec-
tive review of these studies would seem to be of value.
Bearison and Isaacs' (1975) study represents an attempt to inves-
tigate the effects of providing explicit vs. implicit motive and intention
information. Six- and 7-year-old children heard two story pairs which
varied according to three conditions. For the story pairs in the
"intention-inferred" condition, the children had to infer the character's
motives and intentions from the narrative description of the character's
overt behavior. In the "intention-explicit" condition, statements which
reported the characters' intentions were added to the stories. The
stories used in the intention-asked condition were identical to those
in the intention-infe-red condition. However, after hearing each pair
of stories, the children in this condition were asked if each of the
characters "meant to do a bad thing?" The purpose of this type of
probe question was to induce the children to think about the character's
intentions. The results indicated that the children made significantly
more subjective responsibility judgments in the intention-explicit and
intention-asked groups than in the intention-inferred group.
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In interpreting these results, however, some limitations of Bearison
and Isaacs' study should be noted. First, their description of their
stimuli was not detailed enough to allow for a very precise determination
of what the difference was between the stories in which motives and in-
tentions had to be inferred and those in which they were made explicit.
Second, it is possible that the questions which were used in the intention-
asked condition (i.e., whether the character "meant to do a bad thing?")
biased the subjects' subsequent judgments.
Consistent with Bearison and Isaacs' results are some of the data
collected by Leon (1979). In this study, first through seventh grade
children and college students were asked to judge how much punishment
characters should receive in stories that orthogonally combined different
levels of intent with different levels of negative outcomes. The subjects
heard both a set of simple and'a set of complex stories, with the inten-
tion information being explicitly stated in the simple stories but only
implicitly provided in the complex stories. Whereas for the simple
stories there were no significant age differences in evaluation as a
function of the intention of the story characters (i.e., the younger
children's judgments were as much intention-based as were the college
students'), for the complex stories intention had a greater influence
on the adults' judgments than it did for the children's judgments. Thus,
Leon concluded that the age differences in judgments for the complex
stories were due to the children not extracting the same intention infor-
mation as adults.
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An issue,which has received a significant amount of attention in the
moral judgment research, concerns the effects of using verbally presented
vs. filmed stimuli. Although both types of media have been used, only
two studies have directly compared them. Chandler, Greenspan, and
Barenboim (1973) found that first graders gave more intention-based judg-
ments for video as compared to verbal story pairs. In contrast, Berndt
and Berndt (1975) generally found better comprehension of motives and
intentions for their stories than for their films, although evaluations
seemed to be slightly more intention-based for the films. Unfortunately,
neither Chandler et al. nor Berndt and Berndt described their videotape
and verbal materials in enough detail to provide a good idea of how the
two media compared in terms of the motive and intention information that
was portrayed. This, rather than any intrinsic differences between the
media, may be the most important determinant of comprehension and
evaluations. For example, one possible argument would be that motive
information can be conveyed more directly in stories than in filmed
episodes, because motives can be explicitly stated in stories but they
cannot be depicted visually because they are internal states. For
example, in a study comparing motives inferred from picture stories with
motives explicitly stated in verbal stories, Asp, Johnson, and Trabasso
(Note 1) found that children five to eight years of age spontaneously
recalled more internal state (motive) information from the verbal stories
than from the picture stories. Perhaps this kind of result could be
offset by other factors. For example, a character in a film can verbally
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express his desires or portray feelings that strongly imply particular
motives. In this way, information about motives may be conveyed as
clearly in a video format as in a story. Whether or not this particular
speculation is correct, comparisons between the two media cannot be
meaningful unless a careful analysis is made of the information that
is being conveyed by the stimuli used to represent each medium.
Another relevant class of studies comprises those which have
directly assessed children's comprehension motives and intentions. For
example, a major study performed by Flapan (1968) investigated 6-, 9-,
and 12-year-old children's understanding of social interaction depicted
in filmed episodes. The children's understanding of the interaction was
assessed through their recall of the episodes and from their answers to
a set of probe questions.
Several significant age trends emerged in the analysis of children's
recall data. The 6-year-olds gave fewer explanations that accounted
for an action in terms of the just preceding events or the present
setting than did the older children. Also, 6-year-olds made fewer state-
ments that indicated inferences about feelings and about thoughts and
expectations. In general, Flapan noted that those 6-year-olds who did
give explanations expressed these in terms of situations and actions and
not in terms of psychological factors such as feelings, intentions, or
thoughts or interpersonal perceptions. An example of this which Flapan
gives is that a 6-year-old typically would say, "She was crying because
the squirrel was dead," whereas a 12-year-old would say, "She started
crying because she felt sorry for killing the squirrel."
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For probe questions about feelings, 6-year-olds often said that they
did notknow the answer, or answered incorrectly. Most of the 9-year-olds'
answers concerned obvious, uncomplicated feelings that were mentioned in
the dialogue or were clearly depicted in the expressive behavior of the
characters. The 12-year-olds, on the other hand, mentioned a complex
combination of feelings, inferred feelings that were not explicitly
mentioned or depicted in the dialogue or action, or answered by naming a
feeling and then elaborating in terms of the actor's thoughts, intentions,
or expectations. For questions that required some sort of explanation,
the 6-year-olds often said that they did not know, gave inappropriate
answers, or answered in terms of the preceding action or the current
situation. The 9-year-olds explained primarily in terms of the preceding
action or the existing situation, but occasionally explained in psycho-
logical terms. The 12-year-olds, in contrast, usually explained in
psychological terms.
Although Flapan's results support the hypothesis that there are
developmental differences in children's ability to understand and infer
motives and intentions, this statement probably needs to be qualified
because of some limitations in her data. First, her recall data must
be interpreted cautiously, because she noted that many times the psycho-
logical aspects of the situation that were not mentioned by the children
in giving their own accounts of what happened were mentioned in response
to specific questioning. Thus, the recall data appeared to underestimate
the children's comprehension, and it is possible that they did this more
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so for the younger than the older children (see also Stein & Glenn, 1979).
In addition, the results were summed over a great deal of variance with
respect to how difficult the interaction was to understand. Since Flapan
gave a fairly detailed description of the content of the episodes, it is
possible to get some idea of how motives and intentions were portrayed
in her films. Some of the information seemed to have been quite clear
and explicit. For example, the characters often verbally stated their
intentions, as when one character indicated his desire to use another's
pair of skates by shouting at her, "I want a turn." Expressions of
affect or feeling also seemed to be a common way of conveying internal
state information, although it is not possible to determine how clearly
these were portrayed. Conversely, a complete understanding of much of the
interaction seemed to require inferences about rather complicated motives
and intentions, and these often involved a character's perceptions of
another character's feelings and motives. Thus, Flapan's stimuli involved
a very heterogeneous array of motive and intention information. Her re-
sults would have been much more informative had there been some breakdown
of the developmental trends in terms of the type of film information.
Berndt and Berndt (1975) showed preschoolers (mean age = 4-11),
second graders, and fifth graders videotaped episodes which depicted
four types of intentions: instrumental aggression (i.e., aggression
that obtained an object which the actor wanted for himself), accidental
action, displaced aggression, and altruism. For each of the episodes
both an immediate cause (near motive) and a more distant cause (far
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motive) were portrayed. For instance, the actor in one of the episodes
wanted another boy's airplane (near motive) so he could play airport
(far motive). For each filmed episode, a story that corresponded to in
form but not in content was constructed.
The analysis of the children's understanding of motives indicated
that there were no age differences for understanding of the near motives
for the instrumental aggression and accidental episodes. However, the
younger children understood the near motives in the other two episodes
and the far motives in all episodes significantly less well than did the
older children. Since it appears from the description which Berndt and
Berndt provide of their video episodes that the actors verbalized their
near motives in the instrumental aggression and accidental episodes
but may not have done so in the other two episodes, one possible expla-
nation for these results is that the near motive information for the
instrumental aggression and accidental episodes was explicit enough
that even the young children understood these motives. From the descrip-
tion of the episodes, it also appears that the far motives were not very
relevant to understanding the ongoing activity, and that information
about them may have been less clear and explicit than that about the
near motives. In response to questions about intentionality, the older
children performed significantly better than the younger children for
all except the instrumental aggression episode, where there were no
developmental differences.
Studies by Leifer, Collins, Gross, Taylor, Andrews, and Blackmer
(1971) and by Collins, Berndt, and Hess (1974) also found significant
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developmental differences on measures of children's understanding of
motives and intentions. Leifer et al. showed a movie of an adaptation
of a familiar fairy tale to 4-, 7-, and 10-year-olds, and Collins et al.
showed an edited version of an action-adventure television program to
kindergarten, second, fifth, and eighth grade children. Although
neither set of investigators described the type of motive and intention
information portrayed in their films, much of this information was
probably fairly subtle and complex.
This brief review highlights some of the problems in the existing
literature. There are compelling reasons to believe, despite the
paucity of relevant data, that the nature of the information which is
conveyed by stimulus materials has a critical effect upon children's
comprehension and evaluations. Research to date, however, has failed
to deal effectively with this problem. Stimulus construction, for the
most part, seems to have proceeded haphazardly, with the probably
consequence that stimulus materials often fail to answer the questions
which they are intended to address. For example, many of the findings
in the literature concerning age differences in moral judgments or
evaluations may have their basis primarily in developmental differences
in the ability to infer critical information from a given set of stimulus
materials, rather than in differences in the judgment process per se. If
this is indeed the case, then much of the research in this area has not
provided meaningful data on the development of the moral judgment process.
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Story Grammar Research
In this section, we review some studies concerning children's compre-
hension and inferences or internal states which have been generated within
the framework of story grammars. These studies assume that memory for
story information, as assessed either via retelling of the story or by
answering probe questions, is an index of comprehension. Their value is
that, in contrast to most of the traditional developmental research using
stories, memory and comprehension are assessed in terms of specific
information about goals, attempts, and consequences, using recall as well
as systematic interview or probe questions.
In a seminal study, Stein and Glenn (1979) presented a set of simple
stories to first and fifth graders. In one experiment, children's compre-
hension of the stories was assessed through their recall of the stories;
in another experiment, it was assessed by their answers to probe questions
about why things happened as they did in the story. For the recall data,
internal responses tended to be recalled less frequently than other
categories of information, and the fifth graders recalled significantly
more internal responses than the first graders. While most of the first
graders made some references to the intentions or feelings of the charac-
ters, they more frequently concentrated on the outcomes of the action.
However, developmental differences were less common for the probe questions.
The majority of the children's answers were correct for both age groups--81%
for the first graders and 94% for the fifth graders. Although the older
children gave more statements in response to the questions, the younger
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children mentioned internal responses in their answers as frequently as
the older children. In fact, both younger and older children answered
the causal probe questions predominantly in terms of internal responses.
In addition, many of the internal responses that were infrequently re-
called in the first study were often mentioned by both younger and older
children in response to the probe questions. The relatively good perfor-
mance of the younger children in this study as compared to some of the
other studies is probably due to the fact that motive and intention
information tended to be quite clearly specified in Stein and Glenn's
stories.
A recent study by Nezworski, Stein,and Trabasso (1979) has explored
how well children are able to infer and use information from different
story grammar categories in making moral judgments. The important
aspect of the Nezworski et al. study is that the authors controlled for
the semantic content of the information as it varied over the different
story grammar categories.
In order to illustrate how this was done, one of the three stories
is shown in Table 1. This single episode story was written such that the
protagonist would be judged as "naughty". One group of 12 five-year-olds
Insert Table 1 about here
and one group of 12 seven-year-olds heard three such stories and,after
each hearing, made moral judgment ratings, justified the ratings, and
then recalled the story. The judgments were decidedly negative, averaging
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1.22 and 2.19 for the 5- and 7-year-olds respectively, on a 7-point
scale.
In each of five other conditions within each age group, 12 children
heard three stories which were modified by adding two sentences. The
two sentences contained special information which would allow the child
to reinterpret the motives of the protagonist. This special information
contained essentially the same semantic content across stories but was
systematically varied as to which story grammar category it belonged.
Table 2 illustrates the special information categories for the Secret
Trip Story.
Insert Table 2 about here
Note that across the five categories, the same key concepts occur:
it is about to be Peter's birthday,and Mary may obtain a present for
him.
For the five special information conditions, the content from
Table 2 was inserted in the appropriate location of the category for
the story of Table 1. For example, the Internal Response condition
Secret Trip story would read:
"Once there were two children named Peter and Mary
who lived across the street from one another. One
morning Peter called Mary and asked her to come over to
play. Mary knew that the next day was Peter's birthday
and she thought about a birthday present. Mary wanted
to go shopping and she didn't want to tell Peter. So
she told Peter she was sick and could not come over to
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play. Then Mary went shopping and bought a brand new
skateboard. Mary thought it was a special toy and was
glad she kept the shopping trip a secret from Peter."
After each child in each condition heard each of three different stories
(each of which had appropriate special information inserted in appropriate
locations), he or she rated the protagonist, justified the rating verbally,
and recalled the story.
In comparison to the Normal (no special information) version in
Table 1, the addition of the special information significantly increased
the moral judgment ratings in a positive direction for both age groups.
Furthermore, there were no significant differences between the special
information conditions with each grade and there was no grade x condition
interaction. Table 3 summarizes the moral judgment data.
Insert Table 3 about here
Thus, the children in both age groups did equally well in being
able to infer and make use of information about motives from five
different sources of information. As long as the content was the same,
the sources of information as classified by the story grammar did not
appear to matter.
A content analysis of children's justifications for their ratings
also reflects children's ability to use the special category informa-
tion to infer intentions. In Table 4, the proportion of children who
Insert Table 4 about here
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justified their rating by (1) citing the protagonist's actions (e.g.,
"She didn't tell Peter she was going shopping"), (2) making exclusively
negative evaluative inferences, (e.g., "She lied"), (3) including mixtures
of positive and negative evaluative inferences, (e.g., "She lied but sur-
prised Peter with a present"), or (4) exclusively stated positive evalu-
ative inferences (e.g., "She gave Peter a skateboard for a present") are
shown for both the conditions and grades. With respect to the special
category conditions, one can see that the addition of the special category
information increased the number of evaluative inferences in the mixed
and positive polarity categories by 55 percent. The main differences
between the younger and older children's justifications are that the
younger children gave actions whereas the older children gave mixed
polarity inferential justifications.
Summary and Conclusions
Our review indicates that the moral judgment literature has been
plagued by serious methodological problems. A large measure of these
difficulties stem from the fact that the stimulus materials used to
assess children's comprehension and evaluations have tended to be poorly
constructed. Because of this, children have often dealt with stimuli
which lacked critical categories of information or which failed to
clearly specify important connections between categories of information.
Further, stimulus materials have focused on only a small part of the
information which potentially affects the judgment process. Although
these problems have been recognized by several investigators, attempts
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to deal with them have generally been unsuccessful and ineffective, probably
because researchers have had little else besides intuition to guide them.
Several solutions to the problems of stimulus construction can be
suggested. At a minimum, investigators should provide a detailed descrip-
tions of their stimuli, a practice which unfortunately has often not been
followed. For stories, this should usually involve presenting the com-
plete stories; for filmed material, researchers should provide as careful
and complete a description of the film content as possible. Also, it
would probably be useful to have some standardization of stories across
studies, since variation in story structure and content probably accounts
for a great deal of the inconsistancy of results in the literature. Use
of the extended story grammar analysis would also help to reduce some
of the problems of stimulus construction. This analysis can serve several
functions. First, because it provides an explicit analysis of stimuli,
it is useful for constructing stimulus materials which contain the kinds
of information that the researcher wishes to depict for his/her subjects.
Second, it may suggest manipulations of stimulus content that have
interesting effects upon comprehension or evaluations. And third, it may
identify some of the types of information that have important effects
upon children's moral judgments but which might otherwise be overlooked.
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Table 1
Nezworski, Stein, and Trabasso (1979) Secret Trip Story
Setting Once there were two children named
Peter and Mary who lived across
the street from one another
Initiating Event
Internal Response
Attempt
Direct Consequence
React ion
One morning Peter called Mary and
asked her to come over to play.
But Mary wanted to go shopping
and she didn't want to tell Peter
where she was going.
So she told Peter she was sick
and could not come over to play.
Then Mary went shopping and bought
a brand new skateboard.
Mary thought it was a special toy
and was glad she kept the shopping
trip a secret from Peter.
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Table 2
Special Information Categories of Secret Trip Story
The next day was Peter's birth-
day and Mary always gave Peter a
birthday present.
Initiating Event
Internal Response
Direct Consequence
Reaction
Mary's friend told her that the
next day was Peter's birthday
and that he might like a birthday
present.
Mary knew that the next day was
Peter's birthday and she thought
about a birthday present.
Mary gave Peter a present on his
birthday the next day.
Mary was excited about giving
Peter a present on his birthday
the next day.
Setting
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Table 3
Moral Judgment Ratings
Grade
Special Information
Condition Kindergarten Second
None 1.22 2.19
Setting 3.13 3.69
Initiating Event 3.06 3.83
Internal Response 3.42 3.64
Direct Consequence 3.25 3.81
Reaction 3.50 4.06
Note. Data from Nezworski, Stein, and Trabasso, 1979.
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Table 4
Classification of Justifications for Moral Judgments
by Conditions and Grade Level
Type of Justification
Evaluative Inferences
Citation of Mixed
Acts Negative Polarity Positive N
Condition
Normal .38 .54 .03 .00 72
Special Category .12 .26 .38 .20 360
Grade
Kindergarten .23 .34 .22 .15 216
Second .09 .28 .42 .19 216
Note. Data from Nezworski, Stein and Trabasso, 1979.
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